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With all three Detroit-based automakers in dire straits and seeking a Washington bailout, the moment finally has arrived for a radical reinvention of America’s domestically owned auto industry. Which means letting the Detroit Three reorganize under bankruptcy protection, from which several smaller, more nimble and competitive firms would emerge, no longer prisoner to Detroit’s hidebound, century-old decision-making traditions.

To bail out Detroit is not to rescue the U.S. auto industry, despite how the CEOs of General Motors Corp., Ford Motor Co. and Chrysler LLC continue to misrepresent the federal bailout they seek.

For more than two decades, there have been two U.S. auto sectors. There is the familiar Detroit Three (no longer the Big Three), which are corporate cripples after decades of mismanagement.

And there are the much healthier U.S. operations of Asian and European automakers that employ millions of Americans turning out Hondas, Toyotas and BMWs, sooner or later to be joined by Chinese and Indian makers. The foreign-based firms already operate 16 vehicle assembly plants and dozens of parts plants from Alabama to Ohio to Ontario.

Led by GM, Detroit is again a holdout against progress, arguing for the continuation of a failed status quo, just as it resisted everything from today’s life-saving three-point seatbelts to fuel-efficiency standards to the devastating (to Detroit) recent shift in consumer demand to small cars from gas-guzzling sport utility vehicles and heavy trucks.

Detroit arguably stands alone in chronically failing to "get it" since its laudable introduction of enclosed passenger cabins and automatic transmissions before most of today’s motorists were born.

One way or another, Detroit has been cosseted by taxpayers and motorists since the ill-fated Chrysler bailout of 1979; followed by the Reagan-era "voluntary" quotas imposed on imports, which did not deter American consumers from paying the resulting higher prices for better-built Hondas and Toyotas; followed by repeated abeyance or postponements of fuel-efficiency standards the feds sought to impose on Detroit.

The ill-fated 1979 Chrysler bailout, which secured that company’s viability for just two decades, signalled the larger GM and Ford that they also were "too big to fail" and needn’t abandon their complacent ways. The import quotas inspired first the Asian rivals and later the Europeans to leapfrog that barrier by making in America most of the vehicles they sell in America. And granting Detroit leave from onerous fuel-efficiency standards enabled the foreign-based competition to gain a competitive advantage by complying with or exceeding the U.S. mandates.

Detroit’s sense of exceptionalism has not diminished.

Rick Wagoner, GM’s chief executive, was on Capitol Hill last Thursday making a pitch for taxpayer assistance in financing its proposed merger with Chrysler – this after Detroit had secured in September $25 billion (U.S.) in federal funds to finance development of fuel-efficient vehicles.

Yes, you read that correctly. Developing products necessary to ensure their future, as foreign-based firms have long since done with their own money, is something Detroit has to be paid public money to do.

At a moment when Washington is trying to come up with the scratch to keep imperilled homeowners from losing their homes, the Detroit makers further propose that the additional bailout funds they seek – a rumoured $10 billion in GM’s case – be carved out of the $700 billion bank bailout fund that U pay advance in 24 hour.S. lawmakers rightly criticize for failing to provide for homeowners as well as Wall Street banks and brokerages.

As if chutzpah weren’t enough – GM’s finance arm, GMAC LLC, which has lost $9.1 billion in the past two years as a mortgage-lending enabler in the historic collapse of the U.S. housing market – Detroit is also stooping to coercion.

GM has lost an almost incomprehensible $70 billion (U.S.) since the end of 2004, while the U.S. economy was still healthy, and yesterday reported a $2.5-billion third-quarter loss.

Barack Obama backer Roger Altman, the former Clinton-era Treasury official forced to quit under an ethical cloud, and now a top adviser to GM in its merger talks with Chrysler, warned the Obama economic team publicly last week that the collapse of any of the Detroit Three "would be a difficult way for a new administration" to take office.

Reading from the same scare-tactics script, John Snow, a mediocre if generously compensated CEO of U.S. rail giant CSX before becoming George W. Bush’s second, invisible, Treasury secretary, and now chair of Chrysler owner Cerberus Capital Management LP, told CNBC that Washington must ensure "that a vital industry like autos, which is such a big part of the overall economy, doesn’t lead us into a deeper and harsher downturn."

Any bailout of GM, enabling it to purchase Chrysler, would be a bailout of the short-sighted dealmakers at private-equity firm Cerberus in their exquisitely ill-timed bet on Chrysler in buying the firm from Daimler AG last year, only to see Chrysler’s fortunes further plummet after the deal.

Detroit has been a significant destroyer of jobs and shareholder value for the past decade, and sporadically in decades past, as well. Worse, its sclerotic decision-making has helped hold America back from technological leadership in one of the world’s major industries.

As the cockpit of capitalism, banking is an essential service whose seize-up this September required a bailout by global governments. The auto sector is not as important, and the Detroit Three no longer account for more than a fraction of that sector.

And the latest straw GM is grasping at, a combination with Chrysler, proves again how lacking in smarts is the existing troika of Detroit CEOs. A GM already burdened with too many brands (eight) merged with Chrysler’s three brands would require a years-long shedding of jobs and closing of excess plant capacity in search of the "synergies" that former Chrysler owner Daimler found so elusive in its sorry nine-year-long ownership of the firm.

If an Obama who last week pledged to make aid to Detroit a top priority is serious about change, he will rule out a Detroit bailout. Or he and Congress will effectively nationalize Detroit, deploying a team of experts to preside over the dismantling of these firms that for generations have lacked the managerial acuity of founders William Durant and Alfred Sloan of GM, Henry Ford and Walter P. Chrysler.

David Olive writes on business and political issues. He can be reached at dolive@thestar.ca

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